---
owner: gmikcon
status: active
last_reviewed: 2026-10-03
review_interval: 90d
confidence: high
source_of_truth: owner-provided-firewall-log-and-macvendors
---

# pfSense Router

Central router and firewall for the local network.

## Access

- Web UI: `https://192.168.1.1/`
- SSH: `ai_agent_ro@192.168.1.1:22`, read-only access for documentation agents.
- SSH authentication: owner-managed key. The private key `gnexus_book_pfsense_ro` is stored on the owner's PC `gmikcon` (192.168.1.129, dynamic DHCP address) at `~/.ssh/gnexus_book_pfsense_ro`. Agents without direct access can reach pfSense through that PC over SSH (password auth, see gnexus-creds secret `gbook-creds`).
- Secret values are not stored in this repository.

### Read-only account limitations (verified 2026-09-29)

- `ai_agent_ro` (uid 2000, group nobody) can run basic commands (`date`, `ls`, `id`, `cat /etc/ssh/sshd_config`) but CANNOT read `/var/log/*` — all logs are `root:wheel` mode 600.
- No `sudo`, no `clog` binary in PATH, no Match/ForceCommand block in sshd_config — the restriction is plain file permissions.
- WAN outage analysis must therefore use alternative sources: NetworkManager connectivity logs on LAN hosts (`journalctl | grep "state is now"`), OpenVPN reconnect logs on tunnel endpoints, or the pfSense Web UI (owner).
- The default shell for `ai_agent_ro` is `csh`; complex one-liners must be wrapped as `sh -c '...'` (nested quoting is fragile — build the command programmatically).

## Role

- Local network edge.
- Firewall and routing point for internal infrastructure.
- DHCP server for `home-lan` and `home-iot-lan`.
- Local DNS resolver through Unbound.
- Local NTP endpoint.
- Part of the path between local infrastructure and services reachable through trusted network paths.

## Platform

- Hostname: `pfSense.home.arpa`.
- OS: pfSense CE `2.7.2`.
- Base system observed over SSH: FreeBSD `14.0-CURRENT`, amd64.

## Interfaces

| Interface | Description | Role | Address | MAC | Status |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `re0` | `LANTECH` | `home-iot-lan` | `192.168.2.1/24` | `00:e0:4c:68:07:9f` | active, 1000baseT full-duplex |
| `re1` | none | unused | none | `00:e0:4c:68:39:03` | no carrier |
| `re2` | `LANMAIN` | `home-lan` | `192.168.1.1/24` | `00:e0:4c:68:35:ba` | active, 1000baseT full-duplex |
| `re3` | `WAN` | WAN uplink | `172.32.2.78/24` | `70:85:c2:24:ee:4b` | active, 1000baseT full-duplex |

## Routing

Observed routes:

- Default route: `172.32.2.1` through `re3`.
- `192.168.1.0/24` is directly connected through `re2`.
- `192.168.2.0/24` is directly connected through `re0`.
- Host routes for `8.8.8.8` and `2.2.2.2` are present through `re3`.

## WAN L2 Domain (verified 2026-10-03)

The WAN interface `re3` (172.32.2.0/24) shares a **flat, unfiltered L2 segment with other ISP clients** — it is not an isolated point-to-point uplink.

Evidence from `arp -a` over SSH (`ai_agent_ro`):

- 169 ARP entries on `re3` (including own address 172.32.2.78 and gateway 172.32.2.1 at `d4:01:c3:6b:86:b9`); roughly 160+ distinct neighbor MACs of other ISP clients.
- Examples: `172.32.2.5 → 54:ef:33:4b:5a:3d`, `172.32.2.46 → 20:32:33:ea:b3:5a`, `172.32.2.104 → 54:ef:33:4b:5a:a3`, `172.32.2.106 → 00:e0:4c:8d:6b:06`, `172.32.2.141 → d4:da:21:1d:ba:f0`, `172.32.2.195 → 48:8f:5a:3b:3c:32`.
- ICMP ping from pfSense to 20 sampled neighbor addresses (172.32.2.5, .23, .33, .45, .46, .48, .81, .85, .92, .104, .106, .128, .141, .146, .155, .161, .195, .212, .219, .250): 17/20 replied; .106, .141, .219 did not answer ICMP but their MACs were present in ARP — ICMP is partially filtered by client firewalls, ARP is the reliable indicator.
- Implication: other ISP subscribers are on the same broadcast domain; treat WAN-side exposure seriously (no trusted traffic on 172.32.2.0/24, firewall rules on WAN should assume hostile neighbors).

## Friend Peer Link (verified 2026-10-03)

A friend of the owner is on the same ISP and the same WAN L2 segment, enabling a direct low-latency peer link (planned: WireGuard router-to-router).

- Friend WAN: `172.32.2.120`, MAC `24:2f:d0:7e:96:d9` (TP-Link Systems Inc router).
- Friend LAN: `192.168.0.0/24`, gateway `192.168.0.1` (from his tracert to 8.8.8.8).
- Identification method: owner read pfSense Web UI firewall log (Status → System Logs → Firewall) while the friend ran a continuous `ping 172.32.2.78`; the log showed a wall of ICMP echo-requests from `172.32.2.120` to `172.32.2.78` blocked by the default deny rule (1000000103) every second.
- Our WAN blocks inbound ICMP by default (default deny rule), so the friend's ping times out; outbound pings from our side to `172.32.2.120` also get no replies (his router filters inbound ICMP or the ISP filters client-to-client ICMP echo-reply) — direct client-to-client connectivity for the tunnel still needs to be verified after firewall rules are added.
- Planned next steps: add pfSense WAN pass rules for ICMP echo-request/echo-reply and a WireGuard UDP port sourced from `172.32.2.120/32`; then configure WireGuard on both routers (LAN-to-LAN tunnel).

### Stable identifier and rediscovery

- The friend's WAN IP is DHCP-assigned and may change on lease renewal. The MAC `24:2f:d0:7e:96:d9` is the stable identifier. The pfSense WAN DHCP lease file (`/var/db/dhclient.leases.re3`) is root-only readable through `ai_agent_ro`, so lease duration is unknown — assume the friend's lease can change at any time.
- Rediscovery procedure if the friend's WAN IP changes:
  1. Preferred: the friend runs a continuous ping to `172.32.2.78`; the owner reads the pfSense firewall log (Status → System Logs → Firewall, filter ICMP) — the source IP of the ICMP wall is his new WAN address.
  2. Without his cooperation: scan the segment (`nmap -sn 172.32.2.0/24` from a LAN host), then read `arp -a` on pfSense `re3` and match the MAC prefix `24:2F:D0` (TP-Link OUI). Other TP-Link routers in the segment may share the prefix — verify candidates with the ping-trap from step 1.
- Note: inbound packets do not refresh ARP entries on FreeBSD — ARP snapshots alone cannot distinguish an active pinger from a stale entry; use the firewall log as the source of truth for active traffic.

## Local Services

Observed listening services:

- SSH: `*:22`.
- Web UI through nginx: `*:80`, `*:443`.
- DHCPv4 through Kea: `192.168.1.1:67`, `192.168.2.1:67`.
- DNS resolver through Unbound: `*:53`.
- Unbound control: `127.0.0.1:953`.
- Syslog: UDP `*:514`.
- NTP: UDP `*:123`, including bindings on `192.168.1.1`, `192.168.2.1`, `172.32.2.78`, and `127.0.0.1`.

Resolver configuration:

- `127.0.0.1`
- `8.8.8.8`
- `2.2.2.2`
- Search domain: `home.arpa`

## Local Network Topology

The home network currently consists of two local networks implemented through one custom router with multiple network interfaces.

Each local network goes from the router into a switch and then is distributed through the home. The access layer includes wired TVs, PCs, servers, and Wi-Fi access points.

### Home LAN

- Inventory id: `home-lan`.
- CIDR: `192.168.1.0/24`.
- Gateway: `192.168.1.1`.
- Router interface: `re2` / `LANMAIN`.
- Main Wi-Fi SSID: `home`.
- Wi-Fi mode: access points, not a separate routed Wi-Fi network.
- Access points: 2 nodes.
- Mesh mode: enabled for the main Wi-Fi nodes.

### Home IoT LAN

- Inventory id: `home-iot-lan`.
- CIDR: `192.168.2.0/24`.
- Gateway: `192.168.2.1`.
- Router interface: `re0` / `LANTECH`.
- Purpose: service network for smart-home and IoT devices.
- Wi-Fi mode: access points, not a separate routed Wi-Fi network.
- IoT Wi-Fi nodes:
  - `home_iot_0`
  - `home_iot_1`
  - `home_iot_2`

### Current And Planned Policy

Current policy:

- full access between `home-lan` and `home-iot-lan`;
- IoT internet access is currently allowed.

Possible future policy:

- isolate the two networks from each other;
- cut off the IoT network from the internet.

## Dual-Homed Smart Home Server

The smart-home server is present in both networks:

- `192.168.1.101` on `home-lan`;
- `192.168.2.101` on `home-iot-lan`.

Further details still need to be documented: firewall rules, port forwards, VPN routes, DHCP static mappings, and DNS host overrides.
