Settings gains an App section: how to install Navi in the browser — a real
Install button where the browser offers beforeinstallprompt, per-platform
steps where it cannot, since Safari and Firefox never expose that API and iOS
goes through the share sheet — and the Android APK, with its version, size and
checksum, behind a download the app hands to the system browser. The PWA
listener is armed from main.js because beforeinstallprompt fires once, during
startup, long before the panel is ever mounted.

App is now the first tab and every section is linkable: #settings/app,
#settings/mcp, and so on. Parsing moved into utils/hash.js, which the three
places in App.vue that route on the hash now share — before it, #settings/app
was read as the id of a session and opened an empty chat. Switching tabs
rewrites the address with replaceState, so Back leaves Settings instead of
walking back through the tabs, and a bare or unknown #settings normalises to
the first tab.

Checked in Chromium against both the dev server and the built bundle: each
hash opens its section, no /api/sessions/ request is ever made for one, a tab
click leaves history.length alone, and at 390 and 320px the strip keeps five
tabs with the active one scrolled into view and no sideways overflow.

`is_admin_only` was checked in one place out of nine and was not read from
config.json at all, so all seven profiles were reachable by every account with
role `user`. The flag now lives in config.json — the file is the baseline, a
`profile_overrides` row still wins on top of it — and one predicate,
`admin_only_blocked`, is the single place the rule is expressed. The nine
surfaces that list, switch to, spawn or resolve a profile all consult it:
`POST /sessions`, the WebSocket, switch_profile, list_profiles, the system
prompt's "Available profiles" block, spawn_agent and the Synapse reaction
runner. The prompt cache is now keyed by (profile, role), so a user's prompt
can never be served an admin's profile list.

The seven existing profiles (developer, discuss, dispatcher, modeler_3d,
navi_code, secretary, server_admin) are marked admin-only. Three new ones take
their place for ordinary users: assistant, designer_3d and coder. They share one
native tool set — ssh_exec, peer, reload_tools, create_mcp_server, test_mcp_tool,
image_view and gmail are withheld — and differ only in system prompt, model and
MCP groups. navi-web's raw `request` group, and the whole of gnexus-creds and
tgclient, are withheld too.

MCP per-user keys gain the missing half of the rule: a server that declares a
`user_key` slot is refused to anyone but an admin who has no personal key, and
is left out of their tool list entirely, instead of quietly falling back to the
owner's credential and appearing as a tool that cannot work. The refusal names
the server and points at Settings.

Also closes `GET /agents/prompts`, which served every profile's system prompt to
anyone, with no user dependency at all.

The accepted residual risk is written down in docs/profiles.md: the working
directory is a convention, not a sandbox.

Settings → MCP gains a Tools block for admins only: one button, then the
same report the tool prints — what loaded, how many are in the registry,
per-file errors, and names in enabled.json nothing answers to.

It sits inside the existing MCP tab rather than a new one: the reload
rewrites the toolset of the whole server, not just this user's MCP keys,
and it belongs next to the thing it affects. Non-admins never see it.

dist rebuilt together with the source, as the server serves the bundle.

The tab was empty on every install: it listed only servers whose config
declares a `user_key` slot, and no config declared one — which read as
"no MCP servers connected" even though five are wired to profiles.

- GET /mcp-keys now returns every server referenced by at least one
  profile, keyed ones first, with `accepts_user_key`, the slot location
  (null when there is none) and the profile ids that connect it. The
  per-user key store is skipped entirely when nothing has a slot.
- gnexus-creds declares `user_key: {header: Authorization, prefix:
  "Bearer "}` — it is the one server carrying a shared credential, so its
  personal-key field is now real: users with a key run under their own,
  users without one fall back to the shared default.
- The panel lists all servers (transport + profiles), dims the keyless
  rows, and shows a key input only for slotted ones, spelling out the
  shared-key fallback.

docs/api.md and docs/mcp.md updated; backend 1367 passed, webclient 148.