mcp: a run says why a server's tools were withheld, instead of silently lacking them ...

A profile can declare a BYOK-gated server the user has no personal key for. The
manager refuses such a call and build_tool_list drops the server, so the tool
list stays honest — but the system prompt kept naming the server with no
explanation at all. The model knew it existed, held none of its tools, and had
nothing to tell the user, who concluded the assistant simply could not do the
task.

The reason was never stored: it is the complement of what visible_servers kept,
so _apply_mcp_scope derives it from that same value (byok_servers() - allowed)
rather than reading the key store a second time and risking a disagreement with
the first read. It rides in current_keyless_mcp_servers, next to the scope
variable, and _mcp_context_msg names each withheld server where it lists it,
followed by the reason and a pointer at Settings -> MCP keys.

Both ContextVar tokens are returned and reset together; without that the two
existing reset sites leak or raise. The variable defaults to empty, so a run
that never set it (a peer run out of a fresh task) claims nothing.

mcp_status said "without one this server runs on the shared default", which is
false for an ordinary account — the shared credential is admin-only.

profiles: restricted profiles for ordinary users, and a role gate that holds ...

`is_admin_only` was checked in one place out of nine and was not read from
config.json at all, so all seven profiles were reachable by every account with
role `user`. The flag now lives in config.json — the file is the baseline, a
`profile_overrides` row still wins on top of it — and one predicate,
`admin_only_blocked`, is the single place the rule is expressed. The nine
surfaces that list, switch to, spawn or resolve a profile all consult it:
`POST /sessions`, the WebSocket, switch_profile, list_profiles, the system
prompt's "Available profiles" block, spawn_agent and the Synapse reaction
runner. The prompt cache is now keyed by (profile, role), so a user's prompt
can never be served an admin's profile list.

The seven existing profiles (developer, discuss, dispatcher, modeler_3d,
navi_code, secretary, server_admin) are marked admin-only. Three new ones take
their place for ordinary users: assistant, designer_3d and coder. They share one
native tool set — ssh_exec, peer, reload_tools, create_mcp_server, test_mcp_tool,
image_view and gmail are withheld — and differ only in system prompt, model and
MCP groups. navi-web's raw `request` group, and the whole of gnexus-creds and
tgclient, are withheld too.

MCP per-user keys gain the missing half of the rule: a server that declares a
`user_key` slot is refused to anyone but an admin who has no personal key, and
is left out of their tool list entirely, instead of quietly falling back to the
owner's credential and appearing as a tool that cannot work. The refusal names
the server and points at Settings.

Also closes `GET /agents/prompts`, which served every profile's system prompt to
anyone, with no user dependency at all.

The accepted residual risk is written down in docs/profiles.md: the working
directory is a convention, not a sandbox.

mcp: credentials leave the tree, and sub-agents lose the task board ...

Five tracked configs (gnexus-creds, gntodo, hard-panel, synapse, tgclient)
carried live bearer tokens — in git, in every clone, and handed to the admin
client by GET /admin/mcp/config. They now name a variable, and the value lives
in the service .env (chmod 600, untracked).

Substitution happens once, at transport open, next to the project-relative
path resolution: that is the single place a transport is built, so every
stored and serialised config stays placeholder-only and save_mcp_servers —
reached by create_mcp_server and PUT /admin/mcp/config — cannot write a secret
back into a tracked file. A variable that is not set refuses the connection
instead of dropping the header, which would fail open: a server may answer an
unauthenticated request as an anonymous user rather than returning 401.

Sub-agents also drop gntodo, gnexus-creds, tgclient and synapse from their
scopes, and the runner injects a scope anchor unconditionally — a sub-agent
asked to echo one word had picked a project off the task board and researched
it for forty iterations.

Docs: docs/mcp.md#secrets, a migration recipe in deploy/UPDATE.md, the variable
names in .env.example and deploy/env.template, and a regression guard over the
tracked configs.

The old values stay in git history; rotating all five at their sources is the
remediation, not a follow-up.

MCP settings tab: list every connected server, slot only where declared ...

The tab was empty on every install: it listed only servers whose config
declares a `user_key` slot, and no config declared one — which read as
"no MCP servers connected" even though five are wired to profiles.

- GET /mcp-keys now returns every server referenced by at least one
  profile, keyed ones first, with `accepts_user_key`, the slot location
  (null when there is none) and the profile ids that connect it. The
  per-user key store is skipped entirely when nothing has a slot.
- gnexus-creds declares `user_key: {header: Authorization, prefix:
  "Bearer "}` — it is the one server carrying a shared credential, so its
  personal-key field is now real: users with a key run under their own,
  users without one fall back to the shared default.
- The panel lists all servers (transport + profiles), dims the keyless
  rows, and shows a key input only for slotted ones, spelling out the
  shared-key fallback.

docs/api.md and docs/mcp.md updated; backend 1367 passed, webclient 148.

docs: mcp.md (per-user MCP keys BYOK), /mcp-keys endpoints, user_key config