config: give tgclient the shared key it needs to handshake ...

The server declares a user_key slot and no shared credential, so the
startup handshake went out unauthenticated, got a 401, and the client
was marked disconnected — which kept its tools out of the registry
entirely, groups or no groups. The shared key now backs the handshake
and stays the fallback: a personal key from /mcp-keys still wins.

config: tool groups for tgclient and synapse ...

Both servers declare no groups, so every profile asking for "tgclient":
["read", "write"] resolved to nothing: resolve_group reads the static
config, returned [], and no mcp__tgclient__* name ever reached the agent.
Worse, the server's own instructions did reach it — they are selected by
server name, not by group — so the model was told about tools it did not
have. synapse is not exposed by any profile, so its groups change nothing
today; without them, exposing it would repeat the same failure.

read  — observe only.
write — changes to sources, types, targets and routing rules.
admin — hub-wide knobs, not routing: issuing and revoking a source's API
        key, and settings overrides on top of .env. The same fence
        gnexus-book puts around its service-operator tools.

config: point the tgclient MCP server at the live host ...

The committed value was the local dev address (localhost:8710, where
~/Projects/tgclient-mcp serves it) and the server ran with the wrong public
host, so the tools never connected. Both clones now use
https://tgclientmcp.gnexus.space/mcp.

No default headers: the key is per-user by design (BYOD settings field), and
until one is entered the server answers 401.

config: capture the live server configuration ...

Profiles gain the gntodo / gnexus-book / gnexus-creds scopes for agent and
subagent runs, refreshed model lists, and write access where the live setup
has it. MCP server configs pick up their user_key slots, gnexus-book learns
delete_pending_change, and the hard-panel / synapse / tgclient servers join
the tree.