tools: split filesystem into read, write and file_ai ...

- filesystem_read: read, list, find, find_up, grep, info, exists, diff
- filesystem_write: write, append, edit, edit_lines, insert, mkdir, move, copy, delete
- file_ai: ask (was query), edit (was smart_edit)
- paged numbered reads (500 lines / 50 KB), raw copy mode, binary refusal
- nearest-match and numbered-copy hints on failed edits, context after edit
- guards: empty overwrite, non-empty delete, move/copy overwrite
- cross-tool redirects instead of silent wrong-action errors
- legacy 'filesystem' stays for archived sessions (compression, renderers, webclient)
- profiles, prompts, docs and manuals updated; TUI and webclient render the new tools

profiles: the Personal Secretary retires, and every reference goes with it ...

`secretary` had become a second general-purpose assistant: same models, same
tools, one temperature step apart from `assistant`, and admin-only for no
reason the user could see. The directory is gone and the eight remaining
profiles load clean.

A profile that no longer exists is not a harmless orphan — `Agent` resolves
`session.profile_id` on every run and raises `ProfileNotFound`, so any session
left behind would open and then fail on its first turn. Prod sessions were
moved to `assistant` first (115 rows, verified after), and the local clone
along with them (101).

The reaction fallback loses its role table: it existed because the admin
fallback was itself admin-only, which `assistant` never is. `spawn_agent`
falls back to `assistant` too, and the two prompts that recommended
`secretary` now name only `server_admin` and `developer`.

permissions: remove broken client-side gate; add backend design doc ...

The terminal-TUI permission gate was a race: _execute_tools_with_sink
emits ToolStarted and starts the tool on the backend immediately, so by
the time the client dialog appeared the destructive action had already
run -- 'deny' could only stop the session, not un-execute the tool. It
also existed only in the terminal TUI (webclient/android had nothing),
and the system-prompt 'Strict Confirmation' nudge was an unreliable
duplicate.

Remove the broken machinery for a clean slate and plan the real
replacement from zero:

- delete clients/terminal/tui/permissions.py, screens/permission_dialog.py
  and their tests
- strip tui_app.py (engine, _deny_tool, _show_permission_dialog,
  _confirm_shell_command, _stop_session_worker, on_permission_request,
  tool_started gate) and the PermissionRequest TUI event; !cmd now runs
  directly (user-typed, no agent gate)
- drop the 'Strict Confirmation' prompt rule from navi_code/developer/
  tool_developer
- add docs/permissions.md: authoritative backend gate design (engine +
  registry + event + endpoint + agent gate + postgres policy + global
  rules config, sub-agents gated) -- design only, not yet implemented
- update docs/index.md, navi_code_cli.md, profiles.md, testing.md

Until Phase 1 lands there is no destructive-action confirmation -- a
conscious period without the false security of the old race-gate.